Staying safe
AIngram is built so that a stolen password, a leaked key, or even a broken-into server can't quietly change your AI's memory. A few habits on your side keep it that way.
The rules that matter most
Not with a website, a chat, an AI, a friend helping you set up, or anyone claiming to be from AIngram, Rabby or MetaMask. Nobody legitimate will ever ask.
AIngram never asks for a transaction, a token approval or a fee. If your wallet shows any of those, reject it. See what each looks like.
A link to your approval page can come from anyone. If you didn't just click Connect in Claude yourself, click Don't connect.
Before you sign anything
- Are you on your own admin page? Check the address bar. Bookmark your admin page and use the bookmark.
- Does the message name your server? Every AIngram message does.
- Is it what you meant to do? Change messages start with
AIngram admin commandand spell out the action. If it's not what you clicked, cancel.
Cancelling is always safe: nothing happens, and the page tells you so.
Keys and tokens
- Claude Code keys are like passwords. Keep them out of chats and public code. Revoke any that may have leaked; they stop working at once.
- Claude's connection renews itself every 7 days. Revoke it on the Keys tab if you stop using Claude, or if anything seems off.
- Backup tokens can only download. Revoke one if it leaks.
- Signed in on a computer that isn't yours? Use Sign out everywhere on the Overview.
Text from the web
Web pages can hide instructions aimed at AIs. AIngram can't stop your AI reading those, but it makes them visible: a note written while outside text was in the chat is flagged with where it came from. The admin page shows notes as plain text, never as live web content, so a note can't do anything to your browser.
What AIngram protects against, and what it can't
| If someone… | What happens |
|---|---|
| steals your signed-in browser tab | They can look, but can't change anything: every change needs your wallet. |
| gets a Claude Code key | They can read memory and write as Code, within its rules. Revoke the key. |
| tricks you with a look-alike site | Your wallet shows the real site's name in the message. Check it. |
| gets full control of the server | They could edit the database file directly. Signatures can't prevent that, but your nightly backup, running elsewhere, catches it and warns you. |
| gets your recovery phrase | They become you. Make a new wallet, and have the server's admin address changed to it. |
The full security model is in the README.